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L. B. LABORATORIES, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent,
v. WALTER A. MITCHELL, Appellant.
[la, lb] Actions-Contract or Tort.-A complaint alleging that a
certified public accountant was employed to prepare and file
specific tax returns which were due at a specified date and
that he "negligently'' failed to file them in time may be construed to indicate an action in contract as well as in tort;
the description of the failure as negligent does not prevent
the complaint from conveying to the accountant the idea
that he failed to do what he had promised.
[2] Limitation of Actions-Pleading-Amendments.-In taxpayer's action against a certified public accountant for failure
to perform his written obligation to file the taxpayer's tax returns in the time required by law, it is proper to deny the
accountant's motion for leave to amend his answer to plead
the four-year statute of limitations applicable to actions on
written contracts {Code Civ. Proc., § 337, subd. 1), where
such motion was not made until the accountant's motion for
nonsuit on the ground that the action is barred by the twoyear statute applicable to tort actions (Code Civ. Proc., § 339,
subd. 1) was opposed on the ground that the action is based
on breach of a written contract, and where he did not challenge the opening statement of taxpayer's counsel, made four
days before, that the action is one on contract, nor challenge
similar statements made during the presentation of the taxpayer's case.
[3] Accountants-Duties.-Where a certified public accountant
contracts to do a specific thing, namely, to prepare and file
a taxpayer's income tax returns in the time required by law,
the obligation is not limited to the exercise of ordinary care,
but is a positive specific duty, and differs from that of a
physician who does not agree to achieve any particular result but merely agrees to act in a nonnegligent manner.
[4] Limitation of Actions-Pleading-Failure to Plead as Waiver.
-Where the four-year statute of limitations for actions on
written contracts (Code Civ. Proc., § 337, subd. 1) is not
timely raised in an action against a certified public account[1] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Actions, §§ 29, 30; Am.Jur., Actions, § 55.
[3] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Accountants, § 2 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Actions, § 15; [2] Limitation of
Actions, § 148; [3] Accountants; [ 4] Limitation of Actions, § 136;
[5] Limitation of Actions, § 109.
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ant to perform his obligation to file a taxpayer's income tax
returns in the time required by law, and the action is based
on a written contract rather than on negligence, there is no
bar of the action by reason of the statute of limitations.
[5] !d.-Suspension of Statute.-In taxpayer's action against a
certified public accountan~ for failure to perform his written obligation to file the taxpayer's tax returns in the time
required by law, a finding that if the taxpayer's causes of
action were barred by Code Civ. Proc., § 339, or any other
statute of limitations the statute was tolled by the accountant's concealment and representations that he had done all
the things required is supported by evidence that, during the
period in question, the accountant twice had the taxpayer
sign an application for an extension of time to file returns
when the accountant said he could not make out the report
in time, in each instance stating that the taxpayer had nothing
to worry about, and that in connection with so-called "completed returns," which were nullities and which the accountant had the taxpayer sign shortly before the last extension
expired, he stated "that he would take care of the whole
thing," a statement on which the taxpayer relied.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Carl A. Stutsman, Judge. Affirmed.
Action against certified public accountant for damages
suffered from late filing of income tax returns. Judgment
for plaintiff affirmed.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Balthls, Gordon F. Hampton
and E. Talbot Callister for Appellant.
Walter G. Danielson, H. Spencer St. Clair, Alva C. Baird
and William A. Cruikshank, Jr., for Respondent.
Howard W. Campen, County Counsel (Santa Clara), Donald K. Currlin, Assistant County Counsel, and Wade H.
Hover, Deputy County Counsel, as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff was awarded judgment for $17,428.43 for damages in an action the nature of which will
appear later. Defendant appeals.
According to the :findings of the cour~, plaintiff is a corporation. Defendant is a certified public accountant pursuing- his vocation in Los Angeles. Prior to December, 1942,
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defendant represented to plaintiff that he was an expert in
all tax matters, both federal and state, and fully capable
of handling all plaintiff's tax and accountancy problems,
and in reliance thereon plaintiff employed defendant prior
to June, 1942, to handle all of such problems. Pursuant to
the employ:Inent defendant prepared and filed in proper time
plaintiff's tax returns for the calendar years 1940-1942. Still
in reliance on defendant's representations, on February 7,
1944, plaintiff employed defendant to make an income tax
review of its records for 1943 and to prepare and file on
or before March 15, 1944, its federal income and excess profits
tax returns for 1943 and the state franchise tax returns for
the same year. Defendant accepted the employment on
February 7, 1944, and reduced his acceptance to writing in
the form of a letter to plaintiff, stating : ·''This will confirm
your request that this office conduct an income tax review
of the corporate books and records and as a result prepare
the following tax returns for the calendar year 1943; California Franchise Tax Return, Federal Income Tax Return,
Federal Excess Profits Tax Return. These services will be
billed on the basis of $40.00 per diem (eight hours) for all
time devoted thereto (travel time included). Progress-billing invoices will be rendered as of the close of each Saturday's business." It was intended by the parties at the time
the contract was made that defendant was to prepare and
file all of said returns on or before their due date, March
15, 1944. Defendant breached the contract in (1) that J;te
did not make a review of plaintiff's records until the early
part of 1946; and (2) did not file any of the returns until
March 23, 1946. The breach was due to defendant's negligence and carelessness. AB a result of defendant's breach
and negligence plaintiff had to pay penalties on the taxes
due, as the filing of the returns was late.
In further reliance on defendant's representations, plaintiff entered into a written contract on January 27, 1945, for
similar services for the tax returns for 1944. The breach
of the contract by defendant was the same and the same
type of damages followed.
In January, 1947, the United States Treasury Department
notified defendant that certain deductions on the federal
taxes were disallowed and that a 25 per cent penalty for
late filing should be assessed. Defendant notified plaintiff
of the former but not the latter, which he concealed from
plaintiff. Defendant without plaintiff's knowledge protested
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the federal officers' action. Proceedings were had and defendant's protests denied on July 18, 1947, and a further
hearing was requested, all of which was concealed from plaintiff until March 15, 1948, when defendant told plaintiff that
the further hearing would be had and it then learned the
facts. Plaintiff thereafter arrived at a settlement with the
federal officials in which plaintiff paid 50 per cent of the
penalties, all to plaintiff's damage in the amount paid.
Finally, it was found that none of plaintiff's causes of
action were barred by section 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other statute of limitation but if they were
the statute was tolled by defendant's concealment and representations that he had done all the things required.
Judgment was accordingly entered for the damages suffered.
Defendant contends that plaintiff's action, as stated in its
complaint, was one in tort-malpractice of an accountantand not in contract, and later during the trial it shifted
its position to a contract theory to defendant's grave prejudice in that he did not make contract action defenses and
was not prepared to meet a contract action; that judgment
should be ordered entered for him because there was no
evidence (expert testimony) of negligence and the action
based on tort liability was barred by the statute of limitation, Code of Civil Procedure, section 339 ( 1).
The complaint charges in the first count the representation by defendant of his ability to handle plaintiff's tax problems; it ''specially employed'' defendant to prepare and file its
1943 tax returns ; defendant negligently failed to file them in
time ; as a proximate result of the negligence and failure
plaintiff was damaged in a named sum. The second count
contains the same allegations with regard to the state franchise tax returns, the third and fourth as to the taxes for
1944. In his answer defendant alleges that plaintiff employed him but that it was understood that the returns could
not be prepared and filed because of the lack of time. He
pleaded section 339 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
provides a two year limitation for commencing an ·action
upon contract, obligation or liability not founded upon a
written instrument which may well indicate that he was assuming that the "special employment" was an oral not a
written contract as well as that the action was one for negligence, in tort, a liability not founded on a writing where
the injury is to other than person or property. He also al-
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leged that the fault for the late filing was plaintiff's, not his.
Defendant did not demur to the complaint to have it clarified as to whether reliance was had upon negligence or contract or if the latter, whether it was written or oral.
[la] Contrary to defendant's contention, the complaint,
for the purpose of determining whether defendant was misled, may be construed to indicate an action in contract as
well as in tort. The essential factors of the former are
present. A special employment was alleged which points
to a contract, as an employment relation is a contractual
one. It is alleged that defendant was employed to prepare
and file specific tax returns which were due at a specified
date and that he "negligently" failed to file them in time,
which would be a breach of the contract of employment. The
description of the failure as negligent does not prevent the
complaint from conveying to defendant the idea that he failed
to do what he had promised. These allegations were sufficient
to apprize him of what he had to meet, and whether or not
he had made an employment contract with plaintiff and if
so the terms thereof, were within his knowledge. He made
no effort by demurrer to have the complaint clarified.
The indication of a contract action was carried into the
trial. On the taking of the deposition before trial by defendant of plaintiff's president, Olson, its counsel said, ·in
the course of discussion, we are proceeding under an action
against defendant for alleged negligence in performing his
professional services, but at the beginning of the trial defendant's counsel first made an opening statement in which
he said contracts were made between plaintiff and defendant
to prepare the returns. He also said that the complaint was
for negligence and that section 339 (1) (above mentioned)
barred the action. In reply, plaintiff's counsel referred expressly to the written contracts (referred to in the findings)
and said : ''I might just as well dispose of the position of
this defendant in this action that this comes under Section
339 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for the reason that it
does not, and if counsel believes so, then he has entirely
misconceived the whole theory of this action; and if he had
demurred to the complaint on the ground that the complaint
doesn't allege whether the contract of the employment is
in writing or is oral he would then have been advised, because the contract is in writing, and our position is that this
action therefore is not barred by Section 339 of the Code
of Civil Procedure but comes under the provisions of Sec-
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tion 337, which is an action upon a contract obligation or
liability founded upon an instrument in writing, and with
respect thereto, the four-year period of limitation becomes
applicable. . .. I believe it could be said that his breach of
his written employment contract occurred on June 15, 1944."
Defendant made no protest to those statements, nor did he
at any time request a continuance to prepare to meet a contract action ; he did not ask leave to amend his answer to
meet a contract action until later, as will hereafter appear.
Thereafter the first witness called was defendant under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the written
contracts were introduced without objection. On repeated
occasions during the presentation of plaintiff's case his counsel's statement that the action was for breach of contract
was not challenged by defendant.
[2] Defendant moved for a nonsuit on the grounds that
the action was barred by section 339(1) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, asserting that the action was one for negligence
and that there was no evidence of negligence because there
was no expert testimony as in a malpractice case. Plaintiff
opposed the motion on the ground that the action was based
updn breach of a written contract. Defendant then asked
leave to amend his answer to plead section 337 ( 1) of the
Code of Civil Procedure (four-year limitation on actions
to recover on a written contract) as a defense. The court
denied the request on the ground that it was not timely.
It had grounds for exercise of its discretion in making the
ruling because, as seen, the complaint did indicate an action
on contract and in plaintiff's opening statement, four days
before, it stated the action was one on contract.
[lb] Defendant urges that the complaint has the typical
aspects of an action for malpractice (see Dunn v. Dufficy, 194
Cal. 383 [228 P. 1029] ; Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317 [30
P. 545, 29 .Am.St.Rep. 115] ; Hall v. Steele, 193 Cal. 602 [226
P. 854] ; Mirich v. Balsinger, 53 Cal..App.2d 103 [127 P.2d
639] ) , but as we have seen it also has all the elements of
a contract. He also states that in· cases against physicians
it has been stated that the allegation of the employment is
a mere matter of inducement and the action is in tort (Hall
v. Steele, supra, 193 Cal. 602; Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal.2d
302 [57 P.2d 908] ; Hat·ding v. Liberty Hospital Corp., 177
Cal. 520 [171 P. 98); Kershaw v. Tilbury, 214 Cal. 679 [8
P.2d 109]; Estate of Pillsbury; 175 Cal. 454 [166 P. 11, 3
A.L.R. 1396).),. and that a passenger's injury while riding
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on a streetcar is in tort rather than the contract of carriage.
(Basler v. Sacramento Etc. Ry. Oo., 166 Cal. 33 [134 P.
993].) The various holdings on whether an action is tort
or contract are summarized: ''Although the distinctions in
forms of actions have been abolished, the obligation upon
which a cause of action is founded may be either contractual
or delictual in nature. This distinction is still of fundamental
importance with respect to such matters as jurisdiction, venue,
the availability of attachment or garnishment, and the limitation of actions. And an action commenced in contract cannot be amended so as to change the proceeqing into an action in tort, nor may an action commenced in tort be changed
to one in contract.
"For the designation of actions as contractual or delictual,
it is to be noted that a contract is defined as an agreement
t o do or not t o do a certain thing, and a tort as any wrong,
not consisting in mere breach of contract, for which the law
undertakes to give the injured party some appropriate remedy
against the wrongdoer. If a cause of action arises from a
breach of a promise, the action is contractual in nature ; if
it arises from the breach of a duty growing out of the contract, it is delictual, and a tort or trespass is none the less
~:~uch because it also involves a breach of contract. There is
obviously some overlapping here, and where it is not clear
to which class an action belongs, it will ordinarily be construed as in contract rather than in tort. . . .
"Notwithstanding the basic distinctions between actions
on contract and in tort, there are many wrongful acts that
constitute a breach of duty that is not only created by contract but imposed by law as well. Thus, negligence may be
conceived as being of two types: delictual negligence, which
involves a breach of a duty owed to a world at large, as to
the general public in driving an automobile; and contractual
negligence, which consists of a breach of a primary duty
owed to the injured party-a 'polarized' duty arising from
some prior relationship between him and the tortfeasor, as
in the case of a bailee or common carrier. The latter type
of negligence ordinarily gives rise to an action either on contract or in tort, and the injured party may at his election
waive the contract and sue in tort, or waive the tort and
base his action on the contract alone. Thus an injury to a
passenger on a common carrier, by wrongful ejectment or
failure to carry him to his destination, constitutes a breach
of the carr ier's contract of safe carriage to a specific place,
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and also a breach of its legal duty arising from its position
in performing a public 'service. Similarly, an action by a
depositor against a bank for failure to honor a check arises
out of contract in the sense that the injury was sustained
as a result of the contractual relation, but also contains an
element of tort, in that it is based on violation of the duty
to exercise due care. In general, however, actions based on
negligent failure to perform contractual duties, such as those
owing from a hospital or physician to a patient, from an
employer to an employee, and from a landlord to a tenant,
although containing elements of both contract and tort, are
regarded as delictual actions, since negligence is considered
the gravamen of the action." (1 Cal.Jur.2d, Actions, §§ 29,
30.) In regard to an accountant it has been held that an
action against him for failure to perform his obligation to
the person employing him may be in contract. (See Smith
v. London Assurance Corp., 109 App.Div. 882 [96 N.Y.S.
820] ; City of East Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296
[141 N.W 181, Ann.Cas. 1914C 720, 45 L.R.A.N.S. 205] ;
National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App.Div. 226 [9
N.Y.S.2d 554] ; Board of County Oommrs. of Allen County
v. Baker, 152 Kan. 164 [102 P.2d 1006] .)
[3] In the instant case the complaint shows and the court
found that defendant contracted to do a specific thing, namely,
to prepare and file plaintiff's income tax returns in the time
required by law. There is no equivocation or shading of
the obligation. It was not limited to the exercise of ordinary
care. It was a positive, specific duty which he assumed. Any
justUication or excuse for failure to perform it could be a
matter of defense. It differs in that respect from an action
against a physician who does not agree to achieve any particular result; he merely agrees to act in a nonnegligent
manner. Even in the physician cases it would not be doubted
that if a doctor is specifically employed to remove a wart
from the patient's foot but removes one from his face, there
would be a breach of contract. Likewise, it is dissimilar from
an accountant who is employed generally to audit the employer's books where he assumes the general obligation to
exercise due care.
[4] It follows that as section 337 (1), Code of Civil Procedure (four-year limitation period for actions on written
contracts) was not timely raised and the action being based
on a written contract rather than on negligence, there is no
bar of the action by reason of the statute o~ limitations. In
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addition, however, the court found that defendant . wilfully
and fraudulently concealed from plaintiff that the so-called
''completed'' returns were nullities and did not comply with
the law, that the federal officers sought to enforce late :filing
penalties, and that plaintiff did not discover those matters
until March 15, 1948. Defendant claims that finding is not
supported by the evidence.
[5] The action was commenced on December 7, 1948. Four
years prior thereto was December 6, 1944. The breach of
the first contract for filing of the return for the year 1943
occurred on March 15, 1944, when the return was not filed
or in June or July, 1944, to which the time bad been extended
at defendant's request. We therefore look to the evidence
between at most March 15, 1944 and December 6, 1944, to
ascertain whether during that period there was a concealment which would toll the· four-year statute. Mr. Olson,
plaintiff's president, testified that he was solely dependent
on defendant and placed complete trust and confidence in
him for accounting practice in his business and in preparation of tax returns. Defendant visited him shortly after
February 7, 1944, the date of the first letter contract, and
Olson signed the contract. There was no conversation. Defendant did not say it would take not less than six weeks
to prepare the returns. Defendant came out sometime before
March 15, 1944, and had him sign an application for an
extension of time to file returns when defendant said he could
not make out the report in time and hence had to ask for an
extension, to which Olson replied that "It's unfortunate."
But, defendant said : "It was nothing to worry about, just
a matter of form. Q. Did you believe him Y A. I did."
Later, defendant presented another application for extension. About May 12, 1944, he (Olson) "again" asked defendant about the return and the latter said "I mustn't
worry about that because he is capable of taking care of
those things; and I believed him. Q. You believed him. Now,
at the time when the income tax return was due, on March .
15, 1944, did you have money in the bank with which to
pay your tax? A. I did.'' In connection with the so-called
"completed returns" (they were a nullity) which defendant
had Olson sign shortly before the last extension expired, defendant said ''that he would take care of the whole thing
and I shouldn't worry about it. Q. Did you rely upon and
believe what he said to you Y A. I did." From then on
Olson thought the "completed returns" were sufficient by
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reason of what defendant told him. Henricksen, plaintiff's
bookkeeper, testified that defendant told him i;t February,
1944, that the time was too short to prepare the returns by
March 15, 1944, but as will be recalled defendant obtained
extensions of time to July, 1944, and, as above seen, he assured Olson that everything was all right. Defendant's testimony is to the contrary, but nothing more than a conflict
was created. It is clear that the evidence is sufficient to support the court's finding that the statute of limitation was
tolled.
In view of the result reached herein other contentions of
defendant, such as the lack of evidence of negligence to support a t<l'rt action, the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 339 ( 1), that he was deprived of his right toraise contract action defenses, became unimportant.
Amicus curiae contend that assuming the action is one in
tort, Code of Civil Procedure section 339 (1) does not apply;
that section 343, the residuary limitation period of four years
applies; that the malpractice cases applying section 339(1)
were incorrectly decided. From the foregoing discussion
those questions need not be discussed.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J.,
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 19,
1952.
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